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We present a model of income tax avoidance with heterogeneous agents, assuming the 
presence of a comparison income effect and of a psychic cost (disutility) of tax dodging. We 
analyse the policy preferences of the agents, and identify a median-voter political equilibrium. 
Paralleling previous results in the optimal taxation literature, we show that the comparison 
income effect calls for a high degree of progressivity of the income tax; additionally, we find 
that this tendence is strengthened by the psychic cost of avoidance. We then model the 
endogenous formation of the stigma attached to the act of avoidance as a "conformism game". 
We argue that such stigma is motivated by the desire to make redistribution more effective, 
and that it is enhanced by the income comparison effect. 
JEL Code: D72, H26, H31. 
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This is a revised and enlarged version of an article previously appeared as EPRU Working 
Paper no. 15/2005. My deepest thanks to C. Ciardi who suggested that I look into the social 
psychology literature and helped me considerably with its interpretation. Also, thanks to U. 
Galmarini who suggested the proof in fn. 11. A first draft was written while I was visiting 
EPRU, University of Copenhagen, in September 2005; I am indebted to P.B. Sorensen and 
S.B. Nielsen for insightful discussions. Previous versions was presented at the CESifo Area 
Conference on Public Sector Economics, Munich (Germany), April 2006 and at the ESPE 
Annual Conference, Verona (Italy), June 2006: L. Goerke, J. Wilson, H. Verbon and S. Winer 
provided useful remarks. II n t r o d u c t i o n
A problem that economists have traditionally encountered when studying imperfect tax com-
pliance is that, while the phenomenon is quantitatively relevant in all countries (no matter
whether they have developed, transition or developing economies), is not nearly as large as it
should be. If homo oeconomicus were an accurate portrait of the real-world economic agent,
then nobody should ever fully comply with the tax rules, as there are immediate and obvious
gains to be reaped against a small probability of being caught. In reality, while it is presumably
true that, given the chance, almost everybody will commit the occasional act of tax dodging,
only a minority takes this up as a systematic activity.1
There have been various attempts at solving this conundrum. An interesting insight is
oﬀered by works like those by Friedman et al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (1997, 1998), arguing
that tax dodging is closely related to tax implementation, regulation and corruption, and thus
that changes along these dimensions explain most of the variation in non-compliance. We will
follow however another branch of the literature, focusing on the existence of social norms against
tax dodging; see e.g. Gordon (1989), Myles and Naylor (1996) and Orviska and Hudson (2002).
If an individual believes that cheating the government is an intrinsically bad act, that is if she
has interiorised a social norm against such behaviour, she will abstain from it even if it is clearly
lucrative. Possibly, this line of enquiry goes, in some sense, deeper than the preceding one. It
is in fact likely that the presence in the society of a negative attitude towards tax dodging
will aﬀect both the way the tax system is administered and the way individual citizens relate
themselves to it. Where avoiding or evading taxes carries a social stigma there is less scope for
corruption among tax oﬃcers and the tax-payers are more prone to comply with the rules.
One thing which is usually overlooked in the literature on social customs and tax avoidance
is the question of how the norm is established. Why should rational, utility-maximising agents
create a norm which goes seemingly against their own interest? There is thus a missing link
in the analysis; one studies how the norm aﬀect individual behaviour, but does not ask how
individual behaviour contributes to establish the norm. This missing link will be addressed
in the present paper.2 In order to do this, we can rely on two important lines of research,
1According to Schneider and Enste (2002) the average size of the shadow economy in the 90’s was in the range
of 12%, 23% and 39% of GDP for, respectively, developed, transition and developing economies.
2For related attempts, see Feld and Frey (2005), where tax compliance is interpreted as the outcome of a
psychological contract; and Cullis and Lewis (1997), who propose a view of tax compliance as adherence to a
2since both economists and social psychologists have investigated the spontaneous formation of
social norms. In economics, we have the pioneering work of Akerlof (1980) and more recent
examples, like Lindbeck et al. (1999), in which social norms, whose importance reﬂects (among
other things) the number of agents that comply with them, are assumed to arise endogenously.
In social psychology, there are fundamental works showing that indeed groups tend to create
internal rules for behaviour using informal procedures (e.g. Sherif 1936; Hogg and Hardie 1992),
and that conformity to the views of the majority is a powerful factor in determining adherence
to the norm (e.g. Asch 1955; Baron et al. 1996).
The perspective we take here is that social norms do not exist in a vacuum, they must
perform some useful social task in order to ﬁrst arise and then survive. This is for example the
basis of the well-know argument by Coleman (1990) that the presence of externalities creates
a demand for a social norm such that the externalities are regulated; social interactions in
dense networks make then the actual establishment of the norm feasible (see Festinger 2004 and
Dufwenberg and Lundholm 2001 for economic approaches to the problem of norm formation).
Speciﬁcally, we argue that a social norm against tax dodging serves two purposes. The ﬁrst is
straightforward: when the norm is active, compliance rises, hence there will be less distortion
associated with redistributive taxation. In other words, the custom makes redistribution less
costly and more eﬀective. The second purpose is somewhat less self-evident: we suggest that
another role of the norm is to facilitate social competition. Where people feel a strong urge of
bettering themselves, social mobility is high, and the search for status compelling, norms are
extremely important in that they prevent competition from degenerating into a rat race; "not
playing by the rules", for example achieving status by cheating the government, cannot thus
be condoned. If the above is true, then we should ﬁnd that the norm is stronger, the more
competitive the society is; and the same should hold for all customs condemning anti-social
behaviour. There is in fact evidence (Triandis, 1989; Smith and Bond, 1993) that people from
competitive societies like that of the US conform to customs dictating behaviour in matters of
relevance for the society at large, whereas people from more cohesive societies like that of Japan
tend to comply mostly with norms prevailing in their own narrowly deﬁned reference group (be
that their family or the ﬁrm in which they work).
Since both redistribution and social mobility are important especially for the low-income
group, they will be the main supporters of a social norm against an anti-social attitude like
social convention.
3tax dodging. Much of the strength of the norm will thus depend on whether public opinion
is entirely dominated by the high-income classes or whether the middle-to-low-income people
carry some weight in shaping the view of the society. This will in turn depend on the solidity
of the democratic institutions in the country, e.g. the balance of power between the executive,
legislative and judiciary branches of the administration, the independence of the press and
other media, etc. In long-established and well-working democracies like the US, the UK or the
Scandinavian countries there seem indeed to be more stigma associated with tax dodging than
in institutionally more fragile nations like, say, Greece or Italy — not to mention transition or
developing countries.
The model we employ to investigate the questions posed above is a simple one. Our agents
have ﬁxed incomes and must only decide whether to dodge the income tax and if so, to what
extent. In fact, adding a variable labour supply would not be diﬃcult in principle, although
it would make the analysis more involved. The only relevant, but by no means dissonant,
modiﬁcation would be that of extending the scope of the custom, which should include a work
ethic, thus stigmatising in general anti-social attitudes like cheating on one’s taxes or being
absent from work (for a recent take on this latter issue, see Lindbeck and Persson 2006). To
analyse the role of social competition, we assume that preferences incorporate the so-called
"relative utility" or "income comparison eﬀect" (see e.g. Easterlin 2001 for a recent discussion),
that is that agents not only care for their own consumption but also for the "distance" between
their consumption and that of a reference group. This is an immediate but eﬀective way of
capturing the presence of a status-seeking impulse behind the economic decisions of the agent.3
Given the agents’ choices, we then study their policy preferences and the ensuing political
equilibrium in a standard majority voting setting. The winning policy turns out to be the one
preferred by the median voter; therefore, there will be a progressive income tax in place at the
political equilibrium, and some tax dodging will occur. In line with similar results from the
optimal taxation literature, we ﬁnd that the comparison income eﬀect calls for a high degree
of progressivity of the income tax. Additionally, we detect a similar role for the social custom;
the progressivity of the tax system is directly related to the strength of the social norm. This is
plausible, and consistent with casual observation. For example, a recent reform of the income
tax has involved a cut of marginal rates in Italy, beginning from 2005. The necessity of such
3For a broader view of social preferences and their relationship with the social norms, see Fehr and Falk
(2002).
4a reform had been often announced in terms that clearly signal the lack of stigma for non-
compliance: the then Prime Minister in fact endorsed avoidance as "good" behaviour, declaring
that "[i]f reasonable taxes are demanded, no one thinks about avoiding paying them. But if you
ask 50% or more ... I consider myself morally justiﬁed to do everything I can to avoid paying
them"4.
Finally, we examine what the preferences of the agents concerning the force of the social
norm are. It turns out that the strength of the norm against tax dodging can be directly
related to the strength of the income comparison eﬀect, which is consistent with the evidence
cited above as it contributes to explain intercountry diﬀerences in the relevance of the social
custom (the US is a much more competitive and mobile society than, say, Italy, and the norm
should therefore be more binding).
Finally, note that the above succession of steps in the analysis corresponds to a standard
backward solution procedure for a model whose timing is as follows: 1) agents establish social
norms; 2) agents vote on policy; 3) agents make avoidance decisions.
II A tax avoidance model
Consider an economy inhabited by agents diﬀering for their gross incomes y. Gross income is
ﬁxed, and distributed continuously along an interval (y−,y+); the total number of agents is
normalised to unity,
R
yf (y)dy =1 . The government levies a linear income tax on the agents’
incomes, with a marginal tax rate t ≥ 0 and a uniform grant T ≥ 0. The agents have the option
to hide a share of their income from the ﬁsc by exploiting loopholes in the tax code; let a ∈ [0,1)
be the percentage of hidden income, such that r =( 1− a)y is the income actually reported,
and h = ay is hidden income. In order to avoid taxes,5 the agent incurs in some monetary
costs (e.g. by paying a lawyer fee to learn how to circumvent the rules) and in some psychic
4Reported by Time,M a r c h1, 2004, p. 17, emphasis added.
5We model tax dodging as tax avoidance, i.e. a riskless but costly activity, as opposed to tax evasion,w h i c h
is instead risky because of the possibility of pecuniary sanctions if discovered (see e.g. Cowelll 1990b for a
discussion). In fact, the two approaches can be connected using the concept of "cost of evasion", i.e. "the
monetary amount that [a] person would just be prepared to pay in order to be guaranteed that he will get away
with tax evasion" (Cowell 1990a p. 232), and reinterpreting the cost-of-avoidance function as a reduced form of
the cost-of-evasion function. While this does not mean that the two approaches are completely equivalent, it does
normally imply that the main insights survive as we shift across them (Balestrino and Galmarini, 2003, discuss
the point at some length and provide an example).
5costs associated with breaking the social norm condemning tax avoidance (provided such norm
exists). The m-cost function is written K (h,y), and the p-cost function is written θC (h,y),
where θ ∈ [0,1] measures the strength of the social norm (for θ =0the norm is in fact absent).6
We assume that
Kh > 0,K hh > 0,C h > 0,C hh > 0; (1)
K (0,y)=Kh (0,Y)=C (0,y)=Ch (0,Y)=0 , (2)
and that both K (·) and C (·) are homogeneous of degree one in h and y. Then, we can write
per-unit-of-true-income cost functions as
k(a) ≡ K (ay,y)/y = K (a,1); c(a) ≡ C (ay,y)/y = C (a,1), (3)
a n do fc o u r s ew ew i l lh a v et h a tb o t hk(·) and c(·) a r es t r i c t l yc o n v e xa n dt h a t
k(0) = k0 (0) = c(0) = c0 (0) = 0. (4)
The functions deﬁned in (3) are independent of true income, which makes the model much
simpler to analyse and interpret — similar assumptions are used e.g. in Boadway et al. (1994)
and Balestrino and Galmarini (2003). Further, we assume that θ depends on the opinions that
the agents have on whether tax avoidance should be condemned or not, that is on how strongly
they feel that the social custom should be in place; we take it that each type has a preferred level
of the norm and that the social norm is some function, to be deﬁned later, of these individually
ideal norms.
From the above, we can write the agent’s net income or consumption as
X =( 1− t + ta − k(a))y + T. (5)
The agent’s utility depends however not only on her own consumption, but also on her relative
position in the society; she is happier whenever her consumption or net income increases, and
less happy when the consumption or net income of the reference group increases. To capture
this eﬀect in a simple way, we assume that the arguments in the agent’s utility function include
her consumption as well as the diﬀerence between such consumption and the reference standard.
6In the main text, we assume that there is no enforcement of the tax code, and therefore that the monetary
cost of avoidance is unaﬀected by policy. In Appendix A we show that, even if we endogenise tax enforcement,
our main ﬁndings do not change.
6Hence, in general such utility function will be written
u = U (X,X − S,C), (6)
where S is the reference standard, and where utility is increasing in the ﬁrst two arguments and
decreasing in the third. For reasons of tractability, we will however use a more speciﬁcu t i l i t y
function. Speciﬁcally, we postulate that the comparison income eﬀect enters additively, and
choose a quasi-linear utility function. More precisely, we let
x =( 1− β)X + β (X − S)=X − βS (7)
where β is a dummy variable taking values
0 for X ≥ S; e β ∈ (0,1) for X<S . (8)
This means that only agents with consumption below the standard perceive the comparison
income eﬀect; there is in fact some evidence (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005) that such eﬀect is asym-
metric and is experienced mostly by those who do not achieve the reference level, rather than
those who are above it. To keep things simple, we make the extreme assumption that "down-
ward" comparisons do not matter at all.7
Then, utility becomes
u = x(a) − yθc(a). (9)
Substituting the budget into the utility function and rearranging gives:
u =( 1− t + ta − k(a) − θc(a))y + T − βS. (10)
Maximising w.r.t. a.w eg e t
t = k0 + θc0, (11)
which is necessary and suﬃcient for a maximum thanks to the strict convexity of the cost
functions. The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) has the obvious interpretation that, at the optimum,
the percentage of hidden income a equates the marginal beneﬁt (avoided taxation) with the
marginal cost (monetary plus psychic). Note that for t =0the FOC is satisﬁed at a =0 ,a si t
becomes 0=0by (4).
7Falk and Knell (2004) provide an economic analysis that includes both upward and downward comparisons
and takes the important step of endogenising the reference standard (letting the agents "choose the Joneses").
7We denote the solution as
a = a(t,θ). (12)
Given quasi-linearity, and ﬁrst-degree homogeneity of the cost functions, neither gross income
nor the reference standard aﬀect the solution.8 Straightforward comparative statics analysis
yields:
at > 0; aθ < 0, (13)
that is, the avoidance activity increases when the tax rate rises and decreases when its sanc-
tionability increases.9 We also make the following assumption on the behaviour of second
derivatives:
Assumption 1 a) att ≥ 0; b) atθ ≤ 0.
This assumption is satisﬁed by e.g. a quadratic cost function for both monetary and psychic
costs; in general it requires a restriction on the sign of the third derivatives of the cost functions.
It has a plausible interpretation: part a s a y st h a tt h ef r a c t i o no fh i d d e ni n c o m ei n c r e a s e sw i t h
the tax rate at a non-decreasing pace, whereas part b says that whenever the social norm
becomes more stringent, the fraction of hidden income becomes less (or at least not more)
reactive to increases in the tax rate.
As for reported income, r(·)=y(1 − a(·)),i ti se a s yt os e eu s i n g( 13) that r decreases as t
increases, and increases with θ,s i n c erz = −yaz,z= t,θ. Moreover, we have ry =( 1− a) > 0,
that is, reported income rises with true income. However, hidden income h = ay also rises with
income (hy = a>0). This is consistent with the observation that tax avoidance is normally an
activity at which high-income agents are more successful (see e.g. Slemrod 2001).10
Finally, consider net income or consumption. Deﬁne
π (t,θ) ≡ 1 − t(1 − a(t,θ)) − k(a(t,θ)) > 0 (14)
as the complement to unity of the eﬀective tax rate, the percentage of income which is actually
8Quasi-linearity also implies that neither the poll-tax nor the parameter β have any impact on the avoidance
decision.
9Details on the comparative statics are given in Appendix B.
10This is not necessarily true for all forms of imperfect compliance. Black markets activities appear to be
mostly carried out by low-income agents; see e.g. Lemieaux et al. (1994) and Anderberg et al. (2003).
8lost due to taxation, including the beneﬁts and costs of avoidance.11 We can then write X (·)=




aθ < 0; (15)




where the sign of the ﬁrst derivative follows from (11)a n d( 13). The eﬀect w.r.t. t is ambiguous
since when the marginal tax rate is positive and rises, the eﬀective tax rate rises too because
taxation is more stringent but at the same time falls because the percentage of hidden income
increases. Hence, we have
Xθ = yπθ < 0; Xt = yπt; XT =1 ;Xy = π>0. (17)
That is, consumption rises with income and is positively aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h ep o l l -
subsidy, but falls when the norm becomes stronger; changes in the tax rate have an ambiguous
eﬀect.
An important consequence of a(·) being independent from income is that the agent’s po-
sitions on the true income distribution carry over to both the reported and net income distri-
butions; most notably the agents with, respectively, mean and median true income also have
mean and median reported and net income. We shall use frequently this fact in what follows,
as it facilitates the interpretation of the policy results.
III Preferences over policy and the political equilibrium
For simplicity, and in line with most of the literature, we shall assume that the reference standard
is given by the mean consumption level,
S = X (t,T;θ)=π(t,θ)y + T, (18)
where the upper bar denotes an average value and where the second equality sign follows because
all agents have the same a(·) and hence the same π(·). Note, from (17), that
Xt = πty; XT =1 ;Xθ = πθy<0. (19)
11It is possible to show that (11)i m p l i e s1 >t (1 − a)+k + θc ≥ t(1 − a)+k,s ot h a tπ is indeed positive.
To see this consider the −(k
0 + θc
0) ≡− γ curve, which is decreasing in the [0,1]i n t e r v a l .T h eo p t i m a la is given






0 tdz,s i n c e−γ (z) <tfor z ∈ (a,1) by (11). Clearly, if t(1 − a)+k + θc < t then
t(1 − a)+k + θc < 1 for t ≤ 1.
9We are now ready to start with the policy analysis. We assume a simple Downsian model of
political competition where the candidates are solely oﬃce-motivated and commit to policies
before the election. The outcome of the elections is decided by majority voting.
To begin with, let us investigate the agents’ policy preferences. Indirect utility will be
written:
V (t,T;β,θ,y)=( 1− t + ta − k(a) − θc(a))y + T − βX (·). (20)





(a − 1)(y − βy) − βyatθc0
1 − β
, (21)







This observation is important because monotonicity of the MRS guarantees that the indiﬀerence
curves in the policy space satisfy a so-called "single-crossing" condition, which in turn ensures
that a median-voter equilibrium exists under majority voting (see Gans and Smart 1996 for
details). In fact, the single-crossing condition implies that, for any two tax rates t0 and t00 such
that t0 >t 00 and any two agents y0 and y00 such that y00 >y 0,i fy0 prefers t00 to t0,t h e na l s oy00
prefers t00 to t0; in words, agents "on the same side" of the income distribution have consistent
policy preferences.
The government’s budget constraint, written in per capita terms, is simply
tr(t,θ)=T, (23)
where we used the fact that the total size of the population is normalised to unity. Note that,
s i n c ea l la g e n t sh i d et h es a m ef r a c t i o na of their income, we have that
r(t,θ)=( 1− a(t,θ))y. (24)
We can interpret the budget equation as expressing T as a function of t (and θ)a n dc h e c k
whether the revenue curve in the (t,T)-space (holding θ ﬁxed) is strictly concave, i.e. if Tt > 0
and Ttt < 0.12 We note that Tt = r + trt,w h e r ert = −yat < 0 by (13); this is positive as long




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1 (25)
12Incidentally, notice that Tθ = trθ > 0, i.e. if the social norm becomes more stringent, revenue will go up.
10i.e. if the elasticity of reported income w.r.t. the tax rate is less then unity (which is empirically
plausible, see e.g. Kopczuk 2005). The second derivative is Ttt =2 rt + trtt,a n di sn e g a t i v e
since rtt = −yatt ≤ 0 by Assumption 1. Strict concavity of the revenue curve is thus generally
guaranteed.
Consider now the ideal tax rate. It can be identiﬁed by solving Vt =0for t after substituting
T with the revenue constraint T (t,θ):
Vt =( a − 1)(y − βy) − βyatθc0 +( 1− a)y − tyat =0 . (26)
Recalling that for agents with income above the mean we have β =0(because those are also





















, for y ≥ y. (28)
Since at > 0 by (13), it follows that agents with higher than average income would prefer income
subsidisation, but since we ruled out this possibility they will settle for a corner solution, t =0 .
The agent with exactly average income would prefer no policy. This is the most eﬃcient solution,
since it eliminates the social waste of resources associated with avoidance. However, if an agent
desires to achieve some redistribution in her favour, she will willingly trade oﬀ some eﬃciency
against the desired amount of redistribution; all agents with less than average income prefer a
positive rate of income tax, no matter whether this generates tax dodging (an eﬃciency loss).
Close inspection of (27) will readily reveal that the ideal tax rate is monotonically decreasing
in income for y<y (see Appendix B for details). This is actually a straightforward variant of
a well-known result from the literature on the political economy of income taxation (see e.g.
Meltzer and Richards 1981), although we replaced the usual distortion due to a variable labour
supply with the waste of resources devoted to tax dodging.
Given our assumptions on the political competition, recalling that the median-voter theorem
applies, and adding the usual assumption that the median income is below the mean income
(which is true for virtually all real-world income distributions), we can conclude that at the
political equilibrium there will be a positive tax rate, and that a certain amount of tax avoidance
activity will thus be carried out. Letting ym denote median income, and ignoring the term e βθc0












The budget-balancing value of the universal grant will be established via the relationship
T (t(θ,β,ym),θ).
It is interesting to note that the ideal policy problem for agents with below-mean income
(including in particular the median income agent) is well-behaved in the sense that Vtt < 0;t h i s
allows us to perform a meaningful comparative statics analysis to check the impact of changes










The ﬁrst result parallels similar results obtained in the optimal taxation literature (see e.g.
Boskin and Sheshinski 1978 and Ireland 2001), where it has been found that the comparison
income eﬀect calls for a high degree of progressivity of the income tax, and more generally, that
it justiﬁes, from a normative standpoint, the existence of a redistributive tax system. Here, we
argue that also from a positive standpoint the comparison income eﬀect has an important role
to play; it helps to explain why redistributive tax systems are eﬀectively in place in virtually all
the developed countries. The reason is obvious: each voter whose income is below the mean, in
particular here the decisive one, views a positive rate of income tax as a means to achieve some
redistribution in her own favour as well as a means to reduce the net income of the reference
individual; thus, income taxation works from both ends, by boosting one’s consumption and by
decreasing the reference consumption.
The second result is speciﬁc to our contribution, and oﬀers a complementary explanation of
the prevalence of redistributive tax systems; it says that the stronger is the social norm against
tax avoidance, the higher will be the tax rate at the political equilibrium. The straightforward
reason is that when tax dodging carries social stigma, redistribution can be pushed farther
because it entails a lower eﬃciency loss (it generates less avoidance activity).
So far, we discussed the impact of the income comparison eﬀect and of the social custom on
the "statutory", as opposed to "eﬀective", rate of income tax. However, an increase in the tax
rate as determined by the law does not necessarily bring about an increase of the actual tax
13Indeed,  β, θ and c
0 are all less than unity.
14Details of the analysis are given in Appendix B.
12rate faced by the agent. The latter, as we already know from (14), is
τ (t,θ)=t(1 − a(t,θ)) + k(a(t,θ)) (31)




















= −πttθ − πθ. (32)
We can however argue the following. If we evaluate the above derivatives at θ =0 ,w eﬁnd that
since πt|θ=0 = a − 1 < 0 and πθ|θ=0 =0 ,15 then dτ/dβ > 0 and dτ/dθ > 0 by (30). When the
norm against tax dodging begins to take shape, then a stronger comparison income eﬀect and
a stronger social custom both imply a larger statutory tax rate as well as a larger eﬀective tax
rate. However, this marginal result does not necessarily generalise to a global result.
IV Endogenous formation of the social norm
In the analysis so far, we have treated θ as exogenous: we now turn to the analysis of the origin
of the social norm. The modelling strategy that we adopt follows closely the political economy
approach we have used to identify the chosen policy rule — a social norm is informal rather
than backed by the law, but it works pretty much in the same way as a formally established
norm, including the enforcement procedures. Agents have preferences over policies, and then
the policy preferences are aggregated through a formal mechanism yielding the policy choice,
i,e. voting. In a similar way, agents have preferences over the customs and there is an informal
mechanism aggregating these preferences into a society-wide norm. In our Introduction, we
have described this mechanism as an adherence to the view of the majority, basically a form
of conformism. In the social psychology literature, it has been argued (see Festinger 1950 and
Lewin 1965) that if the members of a group perceive a clearly deﬁned common aim, to be
reached by coordinating each agent’s eﬀort with that of the others, there is a strong tendency
to conformism. Obeying to a social norm, whose importance for the stability and ﬂourishing
of the group can well be grasped by its members, is a type of behaviour that can be explained
along these lines, consistently with the arguments by Coleman (1990) referred to earlier.
We begin by identifying the preferences over the strength of the social custom. Let us move
a further step backward and consider how indirect utility is aﬀected by changes in the parameter
15This is because t = k
0 when θ =0by (11).
13θ (expressing the force of the social norm) when the equilibrium policy is in place. Let us then
write
W (y,θ,β)=( 1− tm + tma(tm) − k(a(tm)) − θc(a(tm)))y + T (tm,θ) − βX (tm,θ) (33)
where tm = t(ym,θ,β) and a is chosen optimally given t = tm. We can now ask what the
preferred θ would be for each agent. If we maximise W (·) w.r.t. θ, under the constraint that
θ ≥ 0,16 we have that
Wθ = Vtmtm
θ − βXθ − yc ≤ 0; θ ≥ 0; θVθ =0 . (34)
where Vtm = Vt|t=tm and V (·) is deﬁned by (20).
Consider ﬁrst agents with income below the mean.F o rt h e m ,w eh a v ea ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n ,
θ(y,β) > 0,i d e n t i ﬁed by:
Vtmtm
θ − βXθ = yc, (35)
which can be interpreted as net marginal beneﬁt( Vtmtm
θ −βXθ) equating marginal cost (yc).17
The marginal cost of θ is simply the disutility of violating the norm. The marginal beneﬁti s
instead more complicated, as it includes the impact on the equilibrium tax rate as well as that
on the reference standard. We know that an increase in θ produces a higher equilibrium tax
rate, as tm
θ > 0 by (30); hence, a marginally higher θ will represent a gain for all agents will
income below the median, who would prefer a higher tax rate than the equilibrium one (for
them Vtm > 0), and a loss for all agents with income above the median (Vtm < 0), while agents
with median income will be unaﬀected (Vtm =0 ). As far as the reference standard is concerned,
all agents below the mean income beneﬁt from a marginal increase in θ, since it will reduce
average consumption, Xθ < 0 by (19).
For agents with income equal or above the mean, we have instead a corner solution, since
for them Vtm < 0 and β =0 ,s ot h a tWt = Vtmtm
θ − yc < 0, and therefore θ(y,β)=0 ;for the
high-income agents the social norm does not generate any beneﬁt, only costs.
Condition (35) takes thus diﬀerent forms depending on the level of the agent’s income;
Table 1 summarizes. The comparative statics does not yield unambiguous results; however,
considering the various conditions in turn, there is a presumption that, as income increases, the
16We assume that the constraint θ ≤ 1 is always satisﬁed.
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< 0 and larger (in absolute value) than −yaθc
0 > 0.
14level of y Marg. beneﬁt Marg. cost value of θ
y<y m Vtmtm
θ − βXθ = yc θ(y,β) > 0
y = ym −βXθ = yc θ(y,β) > 0
y ∈ (ym,y) −βXθ = yc− Vtmtm
θ θ(y,β) > 0
y ≥ y 0 > yc− Vtmtm
θ θ(y,β)=0
Table 1: The pattern of preferred strength of the social norm
individually preferred strength of the social norm should tendentially decrease; beneﬁts appear
to fall, and costs to rise, with income. Moreover, it is also to be expected that the individually
optimal θ will rise with β,a sal a r g e rβ appears to entail a larger beneﬁtf r o mθ; as we mentioned
above, a custom against a form of anti-social behaviour like dodging taxes is particularly felt
when there is a strong social competition. We thus make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 The ideal level of the norm is: a) decreasing in income, θy (y,β) < 0, and b)
i n c r e a s i n gi nt h ec o m p a r i s o ni n c o m ee ﬀect, θβ (y,β) > 0.
The picture that emerges so far conﬁrms our claim that the social norm serves the purpose
of enhancing redistribution; even if θ were not monotonically decreasing in y as stated in part
a) of the Assumption, it would still be true that only agents with income below the mean
favour an active condemnation of tax dodging. Our second claim, that the social norm allows a
smoother process of social competition is also well supported because part b) of the Assumption
is extremely weak; intuitively, whenever β increases, the norm becomes more valuable, again
for all agents with income below the mean, because it helps closing the gap with the reference
standard (the presence of the norm forces down average consumption by increasing tax com-
pliance).18 Thus, it is generally true that those supporting the norm will be those in the lower
half of the income distribution, i.e. those who have more to gain from redistribution and social
competition.
We now model the aggregation mechanism, that is the informal procedure that establishes
a society-wide level of the norm. We call it the "conformism game": it consists of several
18Without entering the details of the comparative statics, it can be seen from Table 1 that a marginal increase
in β has, ﬁrst of all, a positive ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the marginal beneﬁt( −Xθ), plus other second-order eﬀects
that can be safely taken as dominated.
15subsequent rounds of simultaneous two-players, one-shot bargaining games, each of them pairing
agents with diﬀering views on what is the "correct" strength of the norm. At the end of a typical
game, the players may agree on a norm, and follow it; or, if no agreement has been reached,
they may continue to follow the same norm as before entering the game. Suppose that all the
games end with the agents agreeing on a level of θ, and that this level is the same across games;
then this common outcome will constitute the social norm.
The outcome of the game depends crucially on the costs associated with the two possibile
courses of action at disposal of the agent — agree or disagree. After the debate, they may
have converged on the same position, or they may have stayed where they were before. There
certainly is an utility loss to face when adopting the other’s view, i.e. when agreeing; there is
however also a cost for disagreeing, and whenever it exceeds the cost of switching sides, the
agent will change idea, and will behave according to the newly adopted norm. Importantly, the
costs for disagreeing are not symmetric; they are heavier for agents in the minority group. This
is essentially the meaning of the tendency towards conformism: the cost of disagreeing depends
on the diﬀerence between the size of the groups to which the agents belong, in the sense that,
the larger an agent’s group size is, the more secure she is in her positions and the lower is for
her the cost of disagreeing.
In order to give a formal account, we start by deﬁning a weight-adjusted income distribution,
where the weights are meant to reﬂect the social inﬂuence of each income group; there is little
doubt that some categories have more say than others in determing the course of things, in the
sense that what they do, the way they behave, constitutes more of a model for the rest of the
society.19 We have
ϕ(y)=m(y)f (y), (36)
where m(y) are the weights, satisfying m(y) ∈ (0,1) for all y,a n d
R
m(y)=1 ; hence, ϕ(y)
has all the properties of a distribution function, i.e. it is nonnegative and integrates to unity. If
m0 (y)=0 , all agents carry the same social weight, whereas if m0 (y) > 0 higher-income agents
have more inﬂuence; we take the latter as our working hypothesis, as it seems more plausible,
and also more consistent with our previous assumptions on the comparison income eﬀect. The
function representing the psychic cost of disagreeing for an agent with income yi arguing with
19Psychological studies highlight that non only the size, but also the authoritativeness, of the group supporting
a given view, determines the success of that view; see Bond and Smith (1996) for a long list of references.







































































the i-agent will take the view of j-agent as hew own — she will conform to that view and act
accordingly.
Each income group will exert some inﬂuence on the neighbouring groups concerning the
"right" strength that should be given to the social norm; this captures roughly the notion that
people tend mostly to communicate, and exchange ideas and opinions, with those who are on
the social ladder in a position similar to their own.
The idea behind the conformism game is that the more inﬂuential group in these interactions
will be the one with the largest adjusted size. Indeed, in the weight-adjusted distribution, there
will be an income level yd representing the mode; the ideal level of the norm for those with
income yd will be θd = θ
¡
yd¢
. We take this group, which constitutes the relative majority, as
the ﬁrst mover in the conformism game: it will exert its inﬂuence on the groups in the intervals
[yd − η1,yd) and (yd,yd + η1], where η1 > 0 is such that the total number of agents in the
intervals is the same as the number of agents in the yd-group.21 The ﬁrst round of games sees
then each agent in the above-deﬁned intervals playing against one agent in the yd-group. Since
all income groups in the intervals are smaller, the agents in them will experience a positive cost
of disagreeing. If the condition in (40) is satisﬁed for all of these agents, there will be at the
end of this ﬁrst round a new relative majority, made of those whose income lies between yd−η1
20We take the extreme view that majority members face no cost for disagreeing; this simpliﬁes the analysis,
but it is not essential (what counts is that costs are asymmetric for agents in groups of diﬀerent sizes).
21We take for simplicity the interval to be symmetric around y
d, but this is in fact inessential
17and yd + η1 (both included), all supporting the view that θ = θd. Indeed, it is easy to see that
each two-player game will end up with both agents agreeing that θ = θd is the "correct" view,
as there are only two possibilities: either the majority member proposes her view ﬁrst, and
the other agrees by condition (40), or the other proposes her view ﬁrst, the majority member
refuses at no cost and counterproposes her opinion, and the other agrees as above.
At the second round, the members of the new majority will exert inﬂuence on the agents in
the intervals [yd−η1−η2,yd−η1)a n d( yd+η1,yd+η1+η2], where η2 is chosen to obtain a number
of additional players equal to those in the new majority group; another round of games is played,
and if the condition in (40) is satisﬁed for the new players, the process continues for another
round, and so on. The conformism game ends when all agents share the same view of what
constitutes the "right" strength of the social norm, or when the (always increasing) majority
ﬁnds, on both sides, a group for which the condition (40) does not hold. In the paper, we have
implicitly assumed that the ﬁrst was the case, mostly for reasons of simplicity; this requires
that the cost function increases suﬃciently rapidly as diﬀerences in group size grow round after












in (40), due to the wider gap in the level of θ that, in turn, follows from Assumption 2a.
Crucially, we see that in general the socially accepted value of θ will be positive as long as
t h em o d eo ft h eadjusted distribution is below the mean of the original distribution, i.e. as long
as yd < y. However, the weight system as well as the original distribution heavily aﬀect the
ﬁnal outcome. If all groups had the same weight, then we would have that, the more unequal
the income distribution, the more towards the bottom would be the mode, and the stronger
would be the social norm by Assumption 2a. But if we adopt the arguably more plausible view
that the weights increase in income (see above), then the mode of the adjusted distribution
m o v e st o w a r d st h em i d d l eo ft h eoriginal distribution; the stronger is the eﬀect of income on
the weights, the closer will yd be to y, and the weaker will be the norm. In an extreme case, yd
could also be larger than y, i.e. no stigma would be attached to tax dodging. Loosely speaking,
we could thus say that a more democratic society, one when all categories have some weight in
the social and political discourse, will give more bite to the norm.
There are other factors aﬀecting the strength of the norm. One such factor is the intensity of
social competition: by Assumption 2b, if we were to compare two otherwise identical societies
diﬀering for the value of β, the one in which social competition is stronger will also have a
stronger norm. Another factor is the relationship between the the mode of the adjusted distri-
18bution and the median of the original distribution. At this level of generality, it is impossible
to say which of the two is larger; again, it is mostly a matter of how the weighting sytem is
speciﬁed. In general the socially accepted norm as generated by the conformism game will not
be the norm that would be preferred by the median voter. However, it is to be expected that
if the income distribution is very unequal, so that the mode is very much towards the bottom,
then also the median will be relatively far from the mean. Thus, the same factor that introduces
strong progressivity in the tax system also favours a strong social norm.
V Concluding remarks
We have modelled the behaviour of taxpayers trying to decide the amount of income they can
hide from the ﬁscal authorities, assuming that their choices are aﬀected by the presence of a
social norm stigmatizing tax dodging and their preferences include a social comparison eﬀect.
After identifying the agents’ equilibrium, we have evaluated their ideal tax policies, and found
that the political equilibrium is of the median voter variety. Then, we discussed the impacts of
the social custom and of the social comparison eﬀect on the policy prevailing at the political
equilibrium, and argued that both make the tax system more likely to be statutorily progressive
(the question whether they make also the tax system being more eﬀectively progressive remains
unresolved).
We also investigated the source of the social norm, introducing an informal mechanism for
aggregating the individuals’ preferences on the norm which we dubbed the conformism game.
We found that the strength of the social custom depends on two factors. First, such a norm
plays a useful social role because it makes redistribution more eﬀective; second, it facilitates
social competition. As such, it is valued mostly by the low-income individuals, who have much
to beneﬁt both from redistribution and social mobility. Hence, it will be particularly felt in
societies with stable democratic institutions in which even the poor can make their voice heard
by the general public. This is consistent with the observation that in mature democracies like
those of the Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian countries there is much more stigma associated with
anti-social acts like tax dodging than in less stable democracies, like those of some Southern
European countries or those of the transition and developing countries.
19Appendix A: Introducing enforcement policy
In fn. 6, we suggested that our results are robust to an obvious extension of the model, that of
including an active enforcement policy. We proceed now to summarise the main steps needed to
reach this conclusion; many details are omitted because the reasoning follows closely the basic
model.
In the modiﬁed version, we write the monetary cost of avoidance as
e(η,θ)k(a), (A1)
with e ≥ 1, eη > 0,e θ > 0 and e(0,0) = 1. Here, e is the enforcement level, taken to depend
positively on goverment expenditure η as well as on the norm θ; this is because of the argument
already alluded to in the Introduction according to which a social climate where avoidance is
condemned should be accompanied by less scope for corruption and other forms of antisocial
behaviour, thereby making enforcement more eﬀective. Utility becomes
u =( 1− t + ta − e(η,θ)k(a) − θc(a))y + T − βS (A2)
and the ﬁrst order condition is t = ek0 +θc0. The solution is a(t,θ,η), and we have (details are
in the next Appendix)
at > 0; aθ < 0; aη < 0, (A3)
as expected; that is, avoidance is deterred both by the norm and by the government expenditure
in enforcement, and boosted by increases in the tax rate. Reported income r(t,θ,η) is deﬁned,




aη < 0; Xη = yπη < 0 (A4)
that is, the eﬀective tax rate is increasing, while consumption is decreasing, in enforcement
expenditure.
The new public revenue constraint is
T (t,θ,η)=tr(t,θ,η) − η, (A5)
and this leads us to rewrite indirect utility as
V (t,η;β,θ,y)=( 1− t + ta − e(η,θ)k(a) − θc(a))y + tr(t,θ,η) − η − βX (·). (A6)
20It turns out that this speciﬁcation satisﬁes the intermediate preferences condition as stated by
Grandmont (1978), because it can be written in the form
V (t,η;y)=V 1 (t,η) · V 0 (y)+V 2 (t,η) (A7)
where V 1 (t,η)=1− t + ta − e(η,θ)k(a) − θc(a) and V 2 (t,η)=tr(t,θ,η) − η − βX (·) are
common across agents and V 0 (y)=y is monotonic in type (income). This implies that ,
although the policy is bidimensional, the conﬂict is in fact unidimensional; then, the median
v o t e rt h e o r e ma p p l i e si nas t a n d a r dm od e lo fpo l i t i c a lc o m pe t i t i o nw i t ho ﬃce-seeking candidates,
commitment, and majority voting. We can easily determine the equilibrium policy, adding the
usual assumption that the median income is below the mean. The median voter’s ideal tax
rate is obtained with the same procedure as in the basic model, and has the same qualitative
properties, including the comparative statics. The median voter’s ideal enforcement expenditure
is found by solving
Vη (ym) ≡ trη − 1 − βXη =0 . (A8)
Since for the median voter β = e β, recalling that rη = −yaη and using (A4), it is easily seen
that the above condition becomes 1=−
³




as we assumed that e βθc0 ' 0. At an interior solution, which we expect to hold normally, the
marginal cost of expenditure — unity — is equated to the marginal beneﬁt in terms of larger
revenue. Note that since aη is independent of income, so is condition (A9):22 all agents agree
on the ideal enforcement expenditure, and therefore the equilibrium expenditure is ideal for all.
Turning now to the analysis of the endogenous formation of the norm, the ﬁrst step is ﬁnding
the preferred level. Letting em = e(ηm,θ) and am = a(tm,ηm), we can write
W (y,θ,β)=( 1− tm + tmam − emk(am) − θc(am))y + T (tm,ηm,θ) − βX (tm,ηm,θ), (A10)
to be maximised w.r.t. θ s.t. θ ≥ 0.W eh a v e :
Wθ ≡ Vtmtm
θ + Vηmηm
θ − βXθ − y(c + eθk) ≤ 0, (A11)
plus complementary slackness. Since however the optimal η is the same across agents, we have
that Vηm =0 , ∀y; the derivative is evaluated at the optimum for all individuals. Then, a
22Strictly speaking, the conditions diﬀer for the fact that β =0for high incomes and β =  β for low incomes;
but since we posit  βθc
0 =0 ,t h i sd i ﬀerence vanishes too.
21comparison between (34) and (A11) readily reveals that from here on, the analysis can proceed
e x a c t l yi nt h es a m ew a ya si nt h eb a s i cm o d e l ,w i t ht h em i n o rd i ﬀerence that the cost of a
marginal strengthening of the norm includes now the change in the monetary as well as the
psychological costs of avoidance.
Appendix B: Comparative statics
As mentioned above, this appendix illustrates the details of the comparative statics, both for
the agent’s and the political equilibrium.
Comparative statics of the agent’s equilibrium. In the basic model, we know that at an
interior solution:
ua = t − k0y − θc0 =0 ;uaa = −k00 − θc00 < 0. (B1)
It is then immediate to compute:









as reported in (13). In the extended version, we have
ua = t − ek0y − θc0 =0 ;uaa = −ek00 − θc00 < 0, (B4)
and hence





< 0; at = −
uat
uaa




Comparative statics of the political equilibrium. In both versions of the model, the ideal
tax rate, for all agents below the average income, is found by solving
Vt ≡ (a − 1)(y − e βy)+( 1− a)y − tyat − e βyatθc0 =0 (B7)
22for t. In order to simplify the derivation of the comparative statics results it is important to









− tyatt < 0; (B8)
the sign follows because att ≥ 0 by Assumption 1. Then, we have
Vty = a − 1 < 0; (B9)
Vtβ = −y(a − 1) = r>0; (B10)




y) − tyatθ > 0; (B11)




< 0; tβ = −
Vtβ
Vtt




T h es i g no ft h eﬁrst derivative tells us that the ideal tax rate is decreasing in income, as explained
informally in the main text. The signs of the second and third derivatives, when applied to the
winning policy, the median voter’s preferred tax rate, conﬁrm (30).
In the extended version, we also have a condition for the ideal enforcement expenditure; but
as we saw, it is independent of income, and the exact way in which it interacts with the norm
and the comparison income coeﬃcent is inessential to the results.
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